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From a currency board to the euro: Public attitudes toward 
unilateral euroization in Bulgaria  
 
I. Introduction. 
  The decision to officially dollarize (or euroize) an economy is of a level of importance 
not easily matched by other economic policy decisions. Dollarization is a lasting, if not a 
permanent, change in the economic environment of a country, with economic costs and benefits 
that extend far into the future and are difficult to quantify. Therefore, the decision to dollarize, 
while influenced by economic analysis, rests primarily in the political domain. According to 
Frieden (2003), political economy considerations explain much more successfully the choice of 
exchange rate regimes compared to standard economic cost-benefit analysis. For example, as 
Willett (2000) points out, the European Monetary Union is here, although according to 
traditional economic analysis, it should not be. This paper contributes to the literature on the 
choice of an exchange rate regime by using unique survey data to reveal the factors driving the 
public support for and opposition to official euroization in Bulgaria. The question is whether 
citizens would support adoption of the euro as official currency and why.
1  
  Bulgaria has operated a currency board regime since 1997 when the exchange rate was 
pegged to the German mark to stabilize the economy after one of the worst financial crises in a 
transition economy. The currency board lowered inflation very rapidly and has sustained low 
inflation since 1997 contributing to rapid rates of economic growth. Hence, a possible decision to 
adopt the euro in advance of entry into the EMU would constitute a move from a relatively 
credible peg to euroization. The literature has not studied such a case, although it is an interesting 
one. Three likely future members of the EMU: Bulgaria, Estonia, and Lithuania, currently 
operate currency boards. Several Caribbean economies with pegs to the US dollar have 
considered adopting the dollar. The literature, e.g., Collins (1996), Edwards (1996), Frieden 
(2003), and Klyuev (2002), has studied the choice between fixed and flexible exchange rates.  
The official policy of the European Union has been to oppose unilateral euroization for 
all accession countries, which has restricted debates on euroization in Bulgaria. Aside from 
several analysts, no government institution or major political party has initiated such a debate. 
                                                 
1 Several papers in the July 2002 edition of the Economics of Transition such as Coricelli (2002), Gros (2002), and 
Sulling (2002) analyze the advantages and disadvantages of early euroization in transition economies. In general, 
official dollarization/euroization has become a frequently discussed policy option in the last several years (see 
Winkler et. al. 2004 for a review).    2
We cannot be sure whether a decision to not adopt the euro reflects EU policies or domestic 
preferences. Bulgarians may very well be in full support of adopting the euro without these 
preferences being revealed in an actual policy choice. One advantage of using the survey data, 
instead of studying the actual policy choice, is that domestic preferences are revealed. The 
literature has generally studied the final outcomes in terms of exchange rate choices making it 
difficult to distinguish between domestic and external factors.
2 The survey data also make it 
possible to study the determinants of support for euroization at the micro level, whereas the 
literature has studied exchange rate choices across countries. For example, the data show 
whether respondents perceive costs and benefits from euroization on the national and on the 
personal level. This allows us to test Kinder and Kiewiet’s (1979, 1981) sociotropic hypothesis 
that citizens are motivated primarily by national economic conditions and not by personal costs 
and gains in evaluating policies and voting. The data also allow us to examine whether the costs 
and benefits of euroization studied by economists are the same as the costs and benefits expected 
by the population at large. For example, there could be forceful reasons to oppose abandoning 
the national currency related to nationalism that do not enter economic calculations.  
The surveys show that Bulgarians are roughly split into three groups: a third are in favor 
of adopting the euro, a third are against euroization, and a third cannot form an opinion. The 
most frequently advanced reasons to support euroization are that adopting the euro would 
eliminate the risk of devaluation against the euro; that it would increase foreign direct 
investment; and that it would speed integration with the European Union. The opposition is 
based primarily on concerns with various fees that may be collected during the conversion of the 
local currency into euro and on the view that the currency is an important national symbol. Loss 
of seignorage does not rank high as a concern. Furthermore, the widespread unofficial 
euroization in Bulgaria contributes strongly to support for official euroization. Respondents who 
perceive a widespread use of the euro in the country are more likely to support official 
euroization. The data also show that the recent strong appreciation of the euro vis-à-vis the dollar 
has not affected the level of support for adopting the euro. The remaining sections in the paper 
elaborate on these results. The next section discusses the pros and cons of euroization in 
Bulgaria. Section III presents the survey data and section IV presents summary statistics from the 
surveys. Section V reports econometric estimates using the data. Section VI concludes. 
                                                 
2 One exception is Gabel and Hix (forthcoming) who study public attitudes toward euroization in the U.K.   3
II.  The theoretical arguments in favor of and against euroization in Bulgaria.    
  Bulgaria introduced a currency board in 1997, pegging the local money (lev) to the 
German mark and later to the euro. During the crisis, which prompted the introduction of the 
currency board, inflation reached hyperinflation levels, the currency depreciated by more than 25 
times within a few months, and a large part of the banking system collapsed. As Dobrinsky 
(2000) describes, the crisis was a culmination of the slow pace and ad hoc nature of structural 
reforms during several years of transition. Public enterprises operated on soft budget constraints 
and many loss-making firms were kelp afloat by direct subsidies from the government or by 
credits from the banking system, which were implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by the 
government. This system started to unravel in 1996 when it became apparent that many loans 
were not performing and that the government, which was already running large deficits, could 
not deliver on the loan guarantees. Confidence in the financial system eroded rapidly, leading to 
massive withdrawals of deposits and flight from the local currency. The economy shrank and the 
socialist government, which was then in office, resigned under the pressure of public 
demonstrations.  
  The new center-right government, which came to power in 1997, cut subsidies, closed 
down large numbers of loss-making state firms, and accelerated privatization. In 1998 alone, it 
privatized as many state firms as were privatized since the beginning of transition. The 
government also tightened welfare and unemployment benefits and sold off many banks. As a 
result, the private sector share of Bulgaria’s GDP increased from 45 percent in 1996 to around 75 
percent in 2002, which put Bulgaria in line with the private sector shares in advanced transition 
economies (EBRD, 2003). The government budget was close to being balanced each year since 
1997. Every major party in Bulgaria has expressed strong commitment to financial stability 
under the currency board regime. Bulgaria is expected to join the European Union in 2007 and 
the European Monetary Union thereafter, at which point the lev will be replaced with the euro. 
The official policy of the Bulgarian National Bank and the European Union has been to keep the 
currency board until entry into the EMU.  
  Theoretically, the choice between flexible and fixed exchange rates is guided by a trade-
off between monetary and exchange rate flexibility under flexible exchange rates and greater 
price stability under fixed exchange rates as in Edwards (1996) and Klyuev (2002) or by a trade-
off between preserving exchange rate flexibility for competitive purposes and maintaining   4
exchange rate stability for the promotion of cross-border trade and investment transactions as 
emphasized by Frieden (2003). In Bulgaria, the currency board rules out monetary and exchange 
rate policies and has delivered low inflation, which means that the trade-offs studied in the 
literature on flexible versus fixed exchange rates do not apply.
3 The gain from euroization is that 
it would eliminate a possible collapse of the currency board resulting in a large devaluation of 
the lev and another episode of financial instability. A low level of confidence in the Bulgarian 
currency board would therefore be associated with support for adopting the euro. The currency 
board contributed to a remarkable economic recovery and to restoring some confidence in the 
local currency, which had plummeted during the crisis. Yet, confidence in the lev remains 
incomplete. Data from the Bulgarian National Bank (various years) show that about 60 percent 
of deposits in the banking system are in foreign currencies, a share that has not declined since 
1997. During the 2000 to 2003 period studied here, the average spread between interest rates on 
one-year local currency bank deposits and euro deposits was 284 basis points, which is a non-
negligible risk premium on leva deposits. As Valev and Carlson (2004) show, the persistent 
expectations of devaluation are explained by concerns over negative external shocks and the 
persistent double digit unemployment. Euroization would eliminate the currency risk premium 
reducing the cost of credit and allowing both greater volume and longer-term maturities of 
financial assets denominated in local currency. Without exchange rate uncertainty, trade and 
cross-border investment may increase contributing to higher growth rates and lower 
unemployment.  
The main economic cost of euroization compared to the currency board is the loss of 
seignorage revenue calculated at about 2 percent of GDP in 2000 by Nenovsky et. al. (2001). 
The conversion to the euro would also involve costs that Nenovsky et. al. (2001), who provide 
the only estimate to my knowledge, predict to be about 8 percent of GDP. This is a substantial 
                                                 
3 According to Williamson (1995), a theoretical currency board is a fixed exchange rate regime similar to a gold 
standard regime. The authorities forego discretionary control over the money supply and replace it with an automatic 
mechanism that links money supply changes to the balance of payments. The amount of foreign exchange reserves 
that the currency board stands ready to exchange for domestic money is sufficient to cover the monetary base.
 The 
currency board has no responsibilities to react to unemployment or to finance the budget. In Bulgaria these operating 
rules are written into the Law of the Bulgarian National Bank. The legal framework makes it difficult to change the 
rules of the monetary regime and also serves as an important “information device” (Ho, 2002) since the objectives 
and tools of monetary operations are spelled out in black and white. Although the law can be changed, it deters ad 
hoc changes in policy. The legal framework is an important difference between currency boards and standard fixed 
exchange rate regimes.  See Miller (2001) for a detailed account of the structure of the Bulgarian currency board and 
its success in stabilizing the economy.    5
burden. Nonetheless, weighing the costs and benefits of early adoption of the euro, a number of 
authors have expressed support for that policy in Bulgaria. According to Nuti (2002, p. 438) 
Bulgaria “presents all the favorable conditions for an early adoption of the euro.” Nenovsky et. 
al. (2001) also conclude that “even if not coordinated with the European Central Bank, 
euroization has more pluses than minuses.” The following sections explore whether the public 
shares those views.  
 
III.   Survey data.  
The paper uses data from two national surveys, which were conducted by a national 
polling organization in Bulgaria in October 2001 and August 2003. The sample of about 1000 
respondents and its demographic structure are standard for national surveys taken in Bulgaria 
and are considered representative of the population of 8 million. The surveys are part of a long-
term project using periodic surveys since 1997 to assess public attitudes toward the economic 
transition in Bulgaria and the level of confidence in its currency board. The surveys are 
conducted by certified professionals using questionnaires with close-ended questions. The 
questions on euroization were first included in the 2001 survey before the physical introduction 
of the euro and were repeated with several additional questions in the 2003 survey.  
The question of primary interest in this paper, Question 1, was asked after survey 
respondents read the following statement: “As you probably know, since the beginning of 2002, 
most countries in Western Europe use the same currency, the euro, after giving up their national 
currencies (such as the German mark, the Italian lira, or the French frank). We in Bulgaria can 
also give up the lev and start using the euro as official currency. This can be done in two ways – 
after we enter the European Union or before that. If we decide to adopt the euro, all leva will be 
replaced with euro, the euro will become official currency in Bulgaria, and the currency board 
will cease to exist.” Then the survey respondents were asked whether they strongly supported, 
supported, opposed, or strongly opposed adopting the euro before joining the European 
Monetary Union. The 2001 survey included the above statement rephrased in terms of near 
future developments in Europe, i.e. “from the beginning of 2002, most countries in Western 
Europe will use the same currency…”  
Two additional questions, Question 2 and Question 3, asked respondents about the 
economy-wide potential benefits and costs of adopting the euro. Respondents could choose up to   6
three answers on the expected benefits of euroization and up to three answers on the expected 
costs of euroization from a list of possible alternatives. The list of answers was constructed from 
the theoretical costs and benefits of euroization, pilot surveys, and issues that appear often in the 
Bulgarian media when discussion of monetary regimes takes place. The 2003 survey included an 
additional question, Question 4, which asked respondents whether they expected any personal 
benefits or costs if the lev was replaced with the euro. They could answer that the conversion 
would have positive, negative or no consequences for them, or choose to say that they didn’t 
know. Using Questions 2, 3, and 4 we can differentiate between the effects of expected 
economy-wide costs and benefits revealed in Questions 2 and 3 and expected personal costs and 
benefits revealed in Question 4 on the level of support for euroization. This distinction is 
motivated by the political science literature, which studies the effect of economic conditions on 
voting. Using U.S. data, Kinder and Kiewiet (1979, 1981) find that voting decisions are 
influenced primarily by national economic conditions, i.e., sociotropic voting, and much less by 
individual economic circumstances, i.e., egocentric or pocketbook voting.  
Next, the 2003 survey inquired about the use of foreign currencies in the economy: 
Question 5: Based on your observations, how frequent are transactions in Bulgaria 
(between citizens and between citizens and firms) in which foreign currencies are used instead of 
leva?  
Respondents could answer that such transactions were very frequent, frequent, not 
frequent, very rare, or that they were not aware of transactions using foreign currencies. This 
question can be used to test whether greater unofficial euroization is associated with greater 
support for official euroization. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Bulgarians use foreign money 
in large transactions such as real estate purchases, some automobile purchases and also some rent 
agreements.  Furthermore, the euro has largely displaced the dollar as the preferred currency in 
these transactions. Unlike the use of foreign money for savings, which can be measured to some 
extent using available statistics from the financial system, the use of foreign money as medium 
of exchange cannot be measured using available data. Question 5 is an attempt to gauge how 
widespread is the use of foreign money in transactions, or at least how widespread is the    7
perception of such use.
4 In a related analysis, Vujcic (2004) makes a compelling argument that 
the high degree of unofficial euroization in Croatia is an important reason to consider early 
adoption of the euro as official currency in Croatia.  
The next question inquires about the expected future value of the euro relative to the 
dollar:    
Question 6: Over the last 5-6  months, the euro became more expensive than the U.S. 
dollar (one euro exchanges for more than one dollar). In your opinion, what will be the 
exchange rate of the euro versus the dollar over the next year? 
Respondents could answer that the euro would remain more expensive than the dollar, 
that the one dollar for one euro exchange rate would be restored or that the dollar will become 
more expensive than the euro, or that they didn’t know. This question is not the typical question 
on exchange rates asked of experts. Surveys of experts ask about point forecasts of various 
exchange rates over a given forecast horizon (Kaminsky 1993). In Bulgaria, the dollar-euro 
exchange rate was often discussed among non-experts in terms of variations around the 1 dollar 
= 1 euro exchange rate at that time. We cannot expect that consumers can forecast the dollar-
euro exchange rate over the next year but we can find out whether expectations of a strong euro 
contribute to support for euroization. The euro was a new currency and the increase of its price, 
inasmuch as it reflects growing demand for it, may have reduced concerns about its viability. 
Conversely, an appreciating euro and, therefore, appreciating local currency reduces the 
international competitiveness of some Bulgarian exports. Hence, a strong euro may be an 
argument against an irrevocable adoption of the euro. In any case, the broader question is 
whether preferences over euroization are influenced by transitory movements in exchange rates 
or by more fundamental reasons.    
The 2003 survey asked several questions about the occupation of respondents, i.e., 
whether they were employed in a firm with predominantly export orientation, whether they were 
employed in a firm with predominantly foreign ownership, and in what sector of the economy 
they were employed: manufacturing, retail and wholesale trade, construction, agriculture, 
                                                 
4 As a parallel, the Eurobarometer surveys on attitudes toward the euro outside the EMU in Denmark, Sweden, and 
the UK (Gallup Europe 2002) inquire whether respondents had seen prices denominated in euro, whether they had 
traveled to countries that use the euro, and whether they had held euro coins and notes in their hands. The goal of the 
questions is to find out whether respondents are familiar and comfortable with the euro currency before inquiring 
about respondents’ attitudes toward euroization in their economies. The survey reports can be obtained at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/euro_en.htm.    8
transportation, or services. These questions can be used to test whether support for euroization is 
stronger in certain segments of the economy. Frieden (2003) points out that support for fixed 
exchange rates is stronger in industries with large cross-border activities, while import-
competing interests may favor flexible exchange rates. In Bulgaria, such differentiation may not 
exist because the lev is already pegged to the euro. The survey also asks about the occupation of 
respondents in terms of being an owner of a private business, employed, student, unemployed or 
retired. Finally, it asks about demographic characteristics: education (less than high school 
education, high school or higher education), age in years, personal income in leva, gender, and 
place of residence (village, small city, big city, or the capital Sofia). Section V uses the 
demographic variables along with answers to the questions above to analyze the cross-sectional 
distribution of support for euroization. Before that, the following section presents a summary of 
the survey results.  
 
IV.   The expected benefits and costs of euroization.    
Table 1 reports the percent of survey respondents who declared support for or opposition 
to euroization in the 2001 and 2003 surveys. The results in 2001 and 2003 were very similar. 
About 30 percent of the respondents did not express an opinion regarding euroization. Of those 
who did, about 49 percent in 2001 and about 48 percent in 2003 supported euroization.  Table 2 
shows that the greatest benefit associated with euroization in both surveys is the zero probability 
of devaluation versus the euro. However, the importance of this expected benefit declined from 
2001 to 2003; 41.7 percent of respondents choose zero probability of devaluation as a number-
one benefit in their first round of choices in 2001 compared to 26.5 percent in 2003. The 
decrease in concerns about devaluation reflects a gradual increase of the public’s confidence in 
the sustainability of the currency board. Other important benefits in the first, second, and third 
round of answers include an expected increase in foreign investment, lower inflation, faster 
integration with the European Union, as well as some gain in income and reduction in 
unemployment. The percent of respondents who chose one or more expected benefits from the 
list declined between 2001 and 2003, while the percent of respondents who answered that there 
were no benefits increased. Similar to the benefit of zero expected devaluation, the importance of 
most benefits declines over time as the economy develops and becomes more integrated with the 
EU while under the currency board regime.    9
In terms of the costs reported in Table 3, the most important problem associated with 
euroization in 2001 was a perceived instability of the euro; 25.2 percent of respondents chose 
this in the first round of answers. As the euro came into physical existence between 2001 and 
2003, only 8.9 percent of respondents expressed the same concern in 2003. Many respondents 
believed that the lev is an important national symbol and an important part of national 
sovereignty, and that euroization would cause a loss on those counts.
5 Many respondents were 
also concerned with fees that may be collected during the conversion of local money into euro. 
Although this didn’t show prominently in the first round of choices, a sizable proportion of 
respondents claimed that there was no essential difference between the currency board and 
euroization in their third round of choices. Only 7.6 percent of respondents were concerned that 
during the switch from lev to euro the government would be able to track the finances of 
individuals, which is somewhat surprising in an economy with a large shadow sector where 
many agents may be concerned about revealing their finances. Also, a very small percentage of 
respondents believed that the loss of interest on foreign currency reserves is an important cost, 
possibly because that is a fairly technical point. In contrast, experts believe that the lost 
seignorage is the most important economic cost of euroization. Overall, the benefits expected by 
the public are more in line with what experts would consider to be the economic benefits from 
euroizatoin, whereas the costs perceived by the public are related more to national pride.  
The 2003 survey asked respondents whether euroization would benefit them personally. 
About twelve percent of respondents answered that they would experience personal benefits 
from euroization and about 14 percent answered that they would be hurt by euroizatoin. Another 
36 percent believed that euroization would have no effect on them and 38 percent answered that 
they did not know whether euroization would benefit them personally. Expectations of national 
and personal costs are well aligned. Only 1 percent of the respondents who expected only costs 
and no benefits on the national level in Questions 3 expected personal gains from euroization. 
Similarly, only 3 percent of those who expected only benefits and no costs on the national level 
expect personal costs. There are many agents, however, who expected national costs or benefits 
but believed that euroization would not affect them personally.  
                                                 
5 A July 2001 study by the European Commission on the preparation of citizens for the changeover to the euro 
described the dynamics of these concerns in the euro-zone: “Nostalgia about the idea of the disappearance of the 
currency as a symbol of national identity: this remains strong in Germany and the Netherlands and is still present in 
other Member States in which it was already seen, but nowadays it is rarely a factor of active resistance: the euro is 
now an unavoidable fact of life, whether people like it or not.” (European Commission, 2001, p. 10)    10
V.  Explaining the support for and opposition to euroization. 
This section uses the demographic variables in the survey along with several variables 
based on the questions discussed above to explain whether or not a respondent supports adoption 
of the euro. About a third of respondents answered that they could not formulate an opinion on 
euroization; hence I employ Heckman’s (1979) procedure to correct for self-selection bias. It 
involves the maximum likelihood estimation of a participation equation which explains the 
decision to express either support for or opposition to euroization and a probit equation 
explaining whether a respondent supports euroization. The procedure produces consistent and 
asymptotically efficient estimates by taking into account the correlation of the error terms in the 
two equations. The dependent variable in the probit equation equals 1 if a respondent supports or 
strongly supports euroization and 0 if a respondent opposes or strongly opposes euroization.  
  Each of the there equations reported in Table 5 include a variable for education equal to 1 
if a respondent had higher education and 0 otherwise, a variable for gender equal to 1 for female 
respondents and 0 for male respondents, and age in years. The reported equations do not include 
income since a fairly large number of respondents did not provide their income. The estimates 
using a smaller sample including income were similar to the ones reported in Table 5 and income 
did not have a statistically significant effect. The decision to express either support for or 
opposition to euroization is explained by education, gender, and age in the participation equation.   
  In addition to demographics, the equation reported in the first column of Table 5 includes 
three variables describing the occupation of a respondent – the variable Entrepreneur, which 
equals 1 if a respondent owned a business and 0 otherwise; the variable Export, which equals 1 if 
a respondent was employed by a firm that exports at least fifty percent of its output and 0 
otherwise; and the variable Foreign Firm which equals 1 if a respondent was employed by a firm 
with at least fifty percent foreign ownership and 0 otherwise. The latter two variables, i.e. Export 
and possibly Foreign Firm, capture cross-border activities. In the political economy literature on 
fixed versus flexible exchange rates, economic agents in sectors with substantial cross border 
activity lend strong support to currency pegs. Entrepreneurs may also expect opportunities 
related to greater integration with the EU and, thus, might be more likely to support euroization.  
  The second column in Table 5 adds two variables based on Questions 5 and 6 to 
education, gender, and age. Foreign Currencies, which is based on Question 4, equals 0 if a 
respondent did not believe that foreign currencies were used in the economy, 1 if a respondent   11
believed that the use was very rare, 2 if the use was rare, etc.
6 Thus a higher value of Foreign 
Currencies signifies a perception of a wider use of foreign money in transactions. We are 
interested in whether such perceptions of unofficial euroization contribute to support for official 
euroization. The second variable, Strong Euro equals 1 if a respondent believed that the euro 
would continue to exchange for more than one dollar, and 0 otherwise. Using this variable we 
can test whether expectations of a strong euro contribute to support for euroization.
7     
  The third column adds four variables based on Questions 2 and 3 to the list of 
demographic characteristics. The variable National Costs equals 1 if a respondent provided at 
least one answer on Question 3 on the costs of euroization, and zero otherwise. The variable 
National Benefits is constructed in the same way using Question 2. Two additional variables, 
Personal Costs and Personal Benefits capture any expected personal gains and losses from 
euroization using Question 4. Personal Costs (Benefits) equals 1 if a respondent expected 
personal costs (benefits) and zero otherwise. The objective of including these variables is 
twofold. First, we can compare the relative effects of national versus personal expected effects 
on support for euroization. Second, we can test for asymmetries of the perceived costs and 
benefits, i.e. whether perceived gains contribute to support for euroization more strongly than 
perceived costs contribute to opposition to euroization.  
  The results in Table 5 show that older respondents were more likely to oppose adopting 
the euro in each of the specifications. Perhaps this result is explained by a stronger attachment to 
the national currency or by a greater willingness of younger respondents to support relatively 
radical policy changes. For comparison, in the 2002 Eurobarometer survey, age has no effect on 
support for adopting the euro in Denmark, Sweden, and the U.K. (Gallup Europe, 2002). The 
first and second specifications in Table 5 suggest that more education is associated with less 
                                                 
6 Table 4 shows that about half of the respondents did not believe that foreign currencies were used for transactions 
in the economy and about 20 percent answered that foreign currencies were used frequently or very frequently. 
Respondents with higher income, younger respondents, and respondents in big cities were more likely to report that 
foreign currencies were used frequently in the economy.  
7 At the time of the survey in August 2003, one euro exchanged for about 1.10 dollars after appreciating by close to 
15 percent since the beginning of the year. As Table 4 shows, few respondents believed that one euro would 
exchange for less than a dollar after a year, i.e. that the euro would depreciate very significantly. Many agents 
believed, however, that the one euro for one dollar parity would be restored, which implied some depreciation of the 
euro. Twenty-two percent of respondents believed that the euro would continue to exchange for more than a dollar 
over the coming year. As it happened, the euro appreciated by another 10 percent during the year following the 
survey.   12
support for adoption of the euro.
8 This effect becomes not statistically significant in the third 
equation controlling for perceived costs and benefits of adopting the euro, which suggests that 
education may be a proxy for some of these views in the first two equations.    
  The estimations in column (1) suggest that affiliation with sectors of the economy with 
significant cross-border activity does not contribute to greater support for adopting the euro, 
which may be explained by the exchange rate stability already provided by the currency board.
9 
Entrepreneurial activity is marginally statistically significant, with entrepreneurs showing 
somewhat stronger support for adopting the euro. Column (2) in Table 5 shows that unofficial 
euroization contributes significantly to support for official euroization, whereas expectations of a 
strong euro have no effect on support for adopting the euro.  
  The estimates reported in the third specification show that the perception of both national 
and personal effects of euroization have a statistically significant effect on support for adopting 
the euro. These results suggest that respondents who perceive national gains but no personal 
gains from euroizatoin are nevertheless more likely to support it and similarly respondents who 
perceive national costs but no personal costs of euroization are more likely to oppose it. The 
sizes of the coefficients suggest a particularly strong effect of the expected national benefits; the 
magnitude of the coefficient on National Benefits is twice larger than the absolute magnitude of 
the remaining coefficients. A public campaign focusing on these benefits may contribute 
strongly to growing support for adopting the euro.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 In the survey, 46 percent of respondents with higher education expressed support for euroization while only 36 
percent of the remaining respondents expressed support for adopting the euro. The estimation results reported here 
reveal the opposite effect of education, which shows the importance of using multivariate estimations and of 
allowing for self-selection. The 2002 Eurobarometer survey shows stronger support for adopting the euro among the 
more educated respondents but only using cross-tabulation without controlling for other effects. It is not clear 
whether this education effect would be significant in a multivariate framework.  
9 Similar statistically non-significant results were obtained using alternative variables for employment in various 
sectors in the economy such as finance, trade, and tourism. The estimations were also performed using variables for 
place of residence, i.e., rural versus urban residence, with no additional statistically significant results.    13
VI. Conclusion. 
The survey data analyzed in this paper reveal the level of support for early adoption of 
the euro in Bulgaria, in advance of Bulgaria’s entry into the European Monetary Union. Bulgaria 
presently has a currency board pegging the local currency to the euro. The surveys show that the 
population is roughly split into three equal size groups regarding euroization. One third of the 
respondents neither supported nor opposed adoption of the euro. About half of the respondents 
who offered an opinion supported early adoption of the euro and about half opposed it. Support 
for euroization is stronger among younger respondents and among people who believe that the 
euro is already being used extensively in the country. The most important expected benefits from 
euroization are the reduced risk of currency devaluation, an increase in trade and investment, and 
more rapid integration with the European Union. The opposition to euroization is based primarily 
on attachment to the national currency and on concerns that the conversion to the euro would be 
costly. Continued financial stability under the currency board, positive economic growth rates, 
and deepening integration with the EU would likely reduce support for euroization because the 
currency board shows that it can deliver many of the benefits associated with euroization, i.e. 
low inflation and exchange rate stability. Simultaneously, however, increased integration with 
EMU countries may increase the use of the euro in the country, which in turn increases the 
public support to formalize the use of the euro. Future studies will tell how these opposing 
factors play out. Of course, in the event of a crisis of confidence in the currency board, support 
for adopting the euro may increase very rapidly from its current levels.  
The European Commission has officially expressed its opposition to early euroization as 
an exchange rate strategy for EU candidate countries and, therefore, policymakers in Bulgaria 
have not engaged in an open debate on this important policy option. According to Sulling (2002), 
the major concern of the European Commission is the inconsistency between early euroization 
and the principles and sequencing of the path towards adopting the euro as provided in the 
Maastricht Treaty and with the economic rationale of the Treaty. A number of economists find 
no significant legal or economic justification for this position (e.g. Nuti, 2002). The results 
presented here suggest that, although a public debate has not taken place, a relatively large part 
of the Bulgarian population is aware of the potential economic benefits and economic costs of 
euroization. It would be interesting to see how these attitudes change if a discussion about 
euroization takes place in Bulgaria.    14
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Table 1 
Support for euroization in Bulgaria. 
Percent of answers in each category. 
 
  Year 2001  Year 2003 
Strongly support  14.9  16.6 
Support 20.4  16.8 
Oppose 17.5  15.2 
Strongly oppose  19.8  20.7 
I don’t know  27.4  30.7 
Total 100.0  100.0   17
 
Table 2 
Expected benefits from euroization in Bulgaria. 
Percent of answers in each category. 
 
Year 2001  Year 2003   
First 
answers 
(783) 
Second 
answers 
(583) 
Third 
answers 
(467) 
First 
answers 
(703) 
Second 
answers 
(440) 
Third 
answers 
(330) 
Lower  unemployment  12.5  1.2 0.6 12.5 3.4 0.9 
Zero probability of devaluation 
vis-à-vis the euro  41.7  8.9 2.8 26.5 8.6 3.9 
Lower inflation   4.8  19.9  3.4  7.3  22.9  6.9 
Lower interest rates on credits   0.9  10.3  5.6  2.6  4.8  6.7 
It would be easier to obtain bank 
credit   2.6  7.0 9.0  1.6 8.2 7.9 
Increase in foreign investment  8.4  22.5  22.3  8.1  19.3  21.8 
Increase  in  income  2.3 6.3 13.1  2.3 11.6 15.5 
Faster integration with the 
European Union   6.3  16.6 23.4  6.1 12.7 23.9 
Reduced  corruption  0.4  1.4 5.6  0.4 2.5 6.0 
Discretionary monetary policy 
will be eliminated  1.8  4.5  14.1  2.7 4.8 6.4 
Other  0.4  0.3 0.1  0.1 0.3 0.0 
There are no benefits  17.9  1.1  0.0  29.8  0.9  0.1 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: Number of respondents in parentheses.    18
 
Table 3 
Expected costs of euroization in Bulgaria. 
Percent of answers in each category. 
 
Year 2001  Year 2003   
First 
answers 
(739) 
Second 
answers 
(561) 
Third 
answers 
(399) 
First 
answers 
(586) 
Second 
answers 
 (374) 
Third 
answers 
(257) 
Financial instability because of 
euro weakness   25.2 1.6  3.0  8.9 1.6 1.9 
Loss of interest on foreign 
currency reserve   6.9 7.4  2.3  8.4 2.4 3.1 
In the conversion, government 
will track individuals’ finances    10.0 6.1  4.0  9.6 9.1 3.9 
Banks will collect fees for 
currency conversions   19.4 22.8  12.5  18.6 21.9  8.9 
Loss of a national symbol  14.1  22.3  22.8  14.3  25.1  23.4 
Loss of national sovereignty  4.8  21.5  23.3  7.8  20.3  25.7 
Discretionary monetary policy 
will be eliminated  1.2 5.2  9.5  3.1 5.6  10.1 
There is no difference between 
euroization and the curr. board  7.1 11.6  22.1  11.9 11.2 18.6 
Other    0.0 0.3  0.5  2.1 0.8 0.8 
There are no costs  11.3  1.2  0.0  15.3  2.0  3.6 
Total  100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: Number of respondents in parentheses.  
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Table 4 
The use of foreign currencies as medium of exchange and expected 
euro-dollar exchange rate in the 2003 survey. 
Percent of answers in each category. 
 
Use of foreign currencies as medium of exchange  Expected value of the euro relative to the dollar 
Not aware of such use   47.8  Euro will remain more 
expensive  22.0 
Very rare use  10.4  Dollar will become more 
expensive than the euro  9.4 
Rare use  20.8  The price will be about one 
dollar for one euro  24.5 
Frequent use  16.8  I don’t know  44.1 
Very frequent use  4.2     
   20
Table 5 
Support for euroization in Bulgaria.  
Probit model with sample selection using the 2003 survey.  
 
Dependent variable: 1 if a respondent supported or strongly supported 
euroization, 0 otherwise 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Higher education  -0.363*** 
(0.103) 
0.389*** 
(0.105) 
0.072 
(0.513) 
Age  -0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.009* 
(0.005) 
Female  -0.024 
(0.078) 
0.006 
(0.083) 
-0.273 
(0.197) 
Entrepreneur  0.329* 
(0.202)    
Export  0.144 
(0.211)    
Foreign firm  0.323 
(0.274)    
Foreign currencies    0.064** 
(0.028)   
Strong euro    0.106 
(0.085)   
National benefits      1.446*** 
(0.237) 
National costs       -0.684*** 
(0.162) 
Personal benefits      0.827*** 
(0.223) 
Personal costs      -0.738*** 
(0.211) 
Constant  0.692 
(0.101) 
0.478 
(0.166) 
-0.111 
(0.401) 
LR test of ind. equations 
Prob > chi2  0.024 0.016 0.832 
 
Participation equation. Dependent variable: 1 if a respondent provided an 
answer, 0 otherwise 
Higher education  0.946*** 
(0.136) 
0.954*** 
(0.136) 
0.962*** 
(0.137) 
Age  -0.011*** 
(0.001) 
-0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
Female  -0.297*** 
(0.084) 
-0.293*** 
(0.087) 
-0.323*** 
(0.088) 
Constant  1.086 
(0.101) 
1.065 
(0.138) 
1.033 
(0.138) 
Model Chi2(7) 
Number of obs. 
31.82 
                974 
23.68 
               970 
212.48 
               975 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***(**, *) indicates significance at the 1(5, 10) percent level.  
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